It’s Time for the Fourth Circuit to Rethink Deshaney by Cecka, Dale Margolin
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2016
It’s Time for the Fourth Circuit to Rethink
Deshaney
Dale Margolin Cecka
University of Richmond, dmargoli@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, and the
Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dale Margolin Cecka. It’s Time for the Fourth Circuit to Rethink Deshaney, 67 S. C. L. Rev. 679 (2016).
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835974 
 
679 
IT’S TIME FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT TO RETHINK DESHANEY 
Dale Margolin Cecka* 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 679 
II. DOE AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE ............ 681 
A. The Facts....................................................................................... 681 
B. The Fourth Circuit’s Holding ....................................................... 683 
III. DESHANEY............................................................................................. 685 
A. State Custody ................................................................................ 686 
B. State Created Danger ................................................................... 687 
IV. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF DOE ........................................... 690 
A. The 14th Amendment..................................................................... 691 
1. State Created Danger ............................................................. 691 
2. Alternative Theory of Liability in School Cases ..................... 694 
3. Deliberate Indifference and Shock the Conscience ................ 696 
B. Other Federal Child Sex Abuse Cases .......................................... 699 
V. TITLE IX AND THE CLERY ACT ............................................................ 701 
A. Title IX .......................................................................................... 701 
1. Case Law ................................................................................ 702 
2. Office for Civil Rights ............................................................ 705 
3. Clery Act ................................................................................ 707 




Each year, the media uncovers sex abuse scandals, which implicate 
educational institutions.1  Civil actions are slowly making their way to 
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federal courts, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (“§ 1983”), Title IX, and 
other causes of action.2  In 2015, the Fourth Circuit heard Doe v. Rosa, in 
which the parent plaintiffs sought to extend civil liability to the Citadel’s 
president, for failing to protect their minor sons from sex abuse inflicted by 
one of the Citadel’s employees.3  In dismissing the matter, the Fourth Circuit 
followed precedent set by the Supreme Court years ago in Deshaney.4  This 
interpretation of Deshaney, however, is no longer valid in light of the 
growing number of sexual misconduct cases involving educational 
institutions.  Strictly applying Deshaney encourages schools to place their 
interests higher than the security of their students.  In fact, other circuits 
have already reinterpreted Deshaney5 in this context.  Although Doe suffered 
from causation problems, an alternate legal interpretation would better 
protect young people and would hold institutional actors liable when they 
are aware of sexual misconduct within their walls.6  Until the Fourth Circuit 
rethinks the general duty that schools have to appropriately protect their 
students and the public, the number of sex scandals and cover-ups in the 
jurisdiction will proliferate.  
The first part of this article describes Doe and the conservative approach 
taken by the Fourth Circuit.7  The second part places Doe within the history 
of the Deshaney framework.8  The third part outlines the ways in which Doe 
could have gone the other way using a more nuanced § 1983 civil rights 
claim.9  The fourth part describes Title IX and surrounding case law which 
give validity to the civil rights claim.10  The fourth part also discusses the 
federal Clery Act, which does not create a private right of action, but does 
reinforce the duties of education institutions to the public.11  In the final 
section, I argue that Deshaney can be inappropriate when applied to sexual 
                                                                                                                            
1. See, e.g., Ajla Glavasevic, St. George’s: Sex Abuse Scandal Rocks a Rhode Island 
Town, LAW STREET (Jan. 12, 2016), http://lawstreetmedia.com/blogs/education-blog/st-
georges-sex-abuse-scandal-rocks-rhode-island-town/. 
2. See Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV., 1465, 1465 (1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(1994)). 
3. Doe v. Rosa (Rosa), 795 F.3d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 2015). 
4. Id. at 438–42 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189 (1989)).  
5. See Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 567 (11th Cir. 1997); Dwares v. City 
of NY, 958 F.2d 94, 99 (2nd Cir. 1993).   
6. See Doe, 795 F.3d at 439.  
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra Part V. 
11. See infra Part V. 
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misconduct cases involving educational institutions.12  I call for a revisit of 
Deshaney in light of the recent sexual misconduct scandals involving 
schools, and the special relationship that institutions have with their students 
and with the public.13 
II. DOE AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE 
A. The Facts 
The plaintiffs in Doe v. Rosa were John Doe 2 and his young brother 
John Doe 3 (“the Does”).14  The Does brought two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims15 (one each for Doe 2 and Doe 3), based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, against the Citadel’s president, John W. Rosa.16  They alleged 
that Rosa violated an affirmative duty under the Due Process of the 14th 
Amendment to protect the brothers from being molested by an employee of 
the Citadel.17  They claimed that the Rosa violated their 14th amendment 
due process right to bodily integrity.18 
Louise ReVille, a youth summer camp counselor at the Citadel, 
provided personal childcare for the Doe family and sexually abused the 
minor boys from 2005 until July or August 2007.19  The abuse occurred 
outside of the Citadel,20 but Reville was employed by the Citadel during the 
time of the abuse, until April 2007.21  According to ReVille’s testimony, he 
abused Doe 2 at least twelve times in 2005 and three or four times a week in 
2006.22  Eventually, ReVille moved into the Does’ home to take care of Doe 
2 and Doe 3.23  The abuse, consisting of “sexual truth-or-dare-games, oral 
sex, physical touching, and masturbation,” continued almost daily between 
the summers of 2006 and early 2007.24  
                                                                                                                            
12. See infra Part VI. 
13. See infra Part VI. 
14. Doe v. Rosa (Rosa), 795 F.3d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 2015).  
15. Id. at 436. 
16. Id. at 431.   
17. Id at 431.   
18. Id. at 436–37.   
19. Id. at 431.   
20. Id. at 435. 
21. Id. 
22. Id.   
23. Id.  
24. Id.  
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In April 2007, a former camper’s father made a complaint to Rosa that 
ReVille had molested his son in 2002 while a counselor at the camp.25  Rosa 
referred the complaint to the Citadel’s General Counsel, who responded to 
the report by confronting ReVille with the accusations made against him.26  
The General Counsel told Reville that “from the Citadel’s standpoint their 
main concern was to protect the institution.”27  At the time, Reville was 
employed by the Citadel at their Writing Center (the camp was no longer in 
operation as of 2006)28.  ReVille resigned from this position sometime in 
April 2007.29  However, neither the General Counsel nor Rosa reported the 
abuse to the authorities.30  Furthermore, they appeared to take measures to 
conceal, or at least gloss over, the allegations.31  For example, after the 
Citadel Summer Camp’s director learned of the allegations, she reported to 
the General Counsel that Reville had been dismissed from his prior job at a 
prep school.32  The Director also disclosed to the General Counsel that she 
had found ReVille in summer 2003 committing a terminable offense by 
being in the barracks alone with a camper rubbing Icy Hot on the camper’s 
leg.33  Neither the General Counsel nor Rosa did anything to investigate 
these facts in light of the Doe allegation.34 
The abuse stopped briefly after ReVille was approached by the General 
Counsel in April 2007.35  But after ReVille did not hear anything further 
from the Citadel or law enforcement, he took the silence as “news that [he] 
was not going to get in trouble.”36  The abuse resumed before the end of 
May 2007 and continued through August when the Does moved to Atlanta.37   
The Does alleged, moreover, that Rosa failed to report the Camper Doe 
complaint to law enforcement;38 that he failed to notify the Citadel’s Title IX 
                                                                                                                            
25. Id. at 431.  
26. Id. at 432. 
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29. Id. at 432–33.  It is disputed whether the resignation took place before or after 
Reville was confronted by the General Counsel, but for the purposes of the summary 
judgment, the Second Circuit assumed that the Does’ version of the facts that he resigned after 
the confrontation was true. 
30. See id. at 433.  
31. See id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  
34. See id. 
35. Id. at 435.  
36. Id.  
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 431. 
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Coordinator;39 and that he failed to adhere to the requirements of the federal 
Clery Act.40  Moreover, the Citadel withdrew a challenge to ReVille’s 
application for unemployment benefits, and ReVille testified that he 
believed this was because the Citadel “did not want to have anything to do 
with [him] as far as any kind of confrontation or anything.”41  Rosa and the 
General Counsel also appeared before The Citadel’s Board of Visitors to 
provide information on Camper Doe’s allegations against ReVille, but, 
according to a third-party investigative report commissioned by The Citadel, 
such minimal detail was given that the Board did not understand the nature 
of the sexual abuse investigation.42 
This intentional cover-up on the part of Rosa and the Citadel, the Does 
argued, gave ReVille the opportunity to continue abuse to Doe 2 and Doe 3 
from late spring to early summer of 2007.43  The District Court granted 
Rosa’s motion for summary judgment in both actions and the Court of 
Appeals upheld the ruling stating that Rosa did not create the danger that 
placed the Does in the position of being molested by the camp counselor.44 
B. The Fourth Circuit’s Holding  
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids “any [S]tate” from depriving “any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”45 and 42 
USC § 1983 offers damages to any person deprived under color of state law 
of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.46  To state a § 1983 
Fourteenth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege a state actor or person 
acting under color of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.47   
The Court in Doe found that the Does met the state actor element for a 
§ 1983 claim because the Citadel is a public university having authority 
granted by state law.48  The Does met the second element by alleging that a 
                                                                                                                            
39. Id. at 434.  See infra Part IV. 
40. Id. See infra Part IV. 
41. Id. at 435. 
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 436. 
44. Id. at 431, 436. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
47. See id. 
48. Doe v. Rosa (Rosa), 795 F.3d 429, 436 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015) (“There is no 
disagreement that Rosa could be a state actor for § 1983 purposes when acting in his capacity 
as the President of The Citadel, as The Citadel is a public university of the state of South 
Carolina.”) 
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constitutional right to bodily integrity was violated.49  § 1983 imposes 
liability on state actors who cause the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution,” including conduct that deprives 
an individual of bodily integrity.50  Courts regularly find that State actions 
that result in sexual abuse of children can be actionable under § 1983.51 
However, the Fourth Circuit found that due process liability was limited 
by the Supreme Court’s ruling in DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services.52  The Court held that following DeShaney 
precedent, Rosa did not create the danger that the Does’ faced.53  The Does 
claim against Rosa is “purely an omission claim,” and “[n]o amount of 
semantics can disguise the fact that the real ‘affirmative act’ here was 
committed by [ReVille], not by [Rosa].”54 
The court went on to explain that to establish § 1983 liability based on a 
state-created danger theory, “a plaintiff must show that the state actor 
created or increased the risk of private danger, and did so directly through 
affirmative acts, not merely through inaction or omission.”55  The court 
concluded that, “[g]iven the clear rule under DeShaney . . . the Does’ claim 
fails because they could not demonstrate [Rosa] created or substantially 
enhanced the danger which resulted in [their] tragic abuse at the hands of 
ReVille.”56  The court held that because Does’ abuse began two years before 
Rosa was made aware of Camper Doe’s complaint,” Rosa ‘could not have 
created a danger that already existed.”’57 
The court also found that Rosa did nothing to create or increase the risk 
of the Does’ abuse specifically during the early summer months of 2007, as 
the Does contended.58  Although the abuse was horrific, the court found that 
nothing occurred between them and ReVille in the summer of 2007 that had 
                                                                                                                            
49. Id. at 436–37 (citing Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th 
Cir.1994) (“addressing a ‘student's constitutional right to bodily integrity in physical sexual 
abuse cases’”)). 
50. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
51. See generally Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.1994) (holding 
“that schoolchildren do have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity . . . and that physical 
sexual abuse by a school employee violates this right.”). 
52. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 438; DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189, 197 (1989).  
53. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 439.  
54. Id. at 441 (citing Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (4th Cir. 1995)).   
55. Id. at 439.  
56. Id.  
57. Id. at 439 (quoting Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th 
Cir.1998)). 
58. Id.  
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not been ongoing for two years unrelated to any action by Rosa.59  Using the 
DeShaney standard, the court found “allowing continued exposure to an 
existing danger by failing to intervene is not the equivalent of creating or 
increasing the risk of that danger.”60  The Does were thus placed in “no 
worse position than that in which [they] would have been had [Rosa] not 
acted at all.”61  
III. DESHANEY  
In DeShaney62 the Supreme Court decided the scope of a state actor’s 
liability for failing to protect an individual from harm.63  In DeShaney, a 
mother, on behalf of her child, brought a § 1983 action against officials from 
the state’s social services agency.64  The child had been beaten and 
permanently brain damaged by his father.65  The mother alleged that the 
state officials “failed to remove the child from his father’s custody, despite 
repeated reports and evidence of the father’s abuse, and that failure to act 
deprived the child of a liberty interest in violation of his due process 
rights.”66  The Supreme Court ultimately denied DeShaney’s federal 
constitutional claim because: 
Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires 
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens 
against invasion by private actors.  The Clause is phrased as a 
limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain 
minimal levels of safety and security.  It forbids the State itself to 
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without “due process 
of law,” but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an 
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do 
not come to harm through other means.  Nor does history support 
such an expansive reading of the constitutional text . . . the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
prevent government “from abusing [its] power, or employing it as 
                                                                                                                            
59. Id.  
60. Id. at 439–40 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Social Services, 489 
U.S. 189, 201 (1989)). 
61. Id. at 440 (citing Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 201). 
62. Deshaney, 489 U.S. 189.  
63. See id. at 191. 
64. See id. at 193.  
65. See id. 
66. Rosa, 795 F.3d at 437 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191).  
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an instrument of oppression[.]”  Its purpose was to protect the 
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them 
from each other.67 
According to the DeShaney Court, even though the Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services was aware of the harm the child was facing, it 
did not have a duty to protect him.68  
Despite this reasoning, the DeShaney Court did find two narrow 
exceptions where state actor liability might attach.69  The first is the state-
custody or special-relationship exception.70  
A. State Custody 
The state custody exception is evoked “when the State takes a person 
into its custody and holds him there against his will.”71  According to the 
Deshaney Court, [“the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's 
knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent 
to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to 
act on his own behalf.”72  Therefore, if a state actor has restricted the 
physical liberty of an individual, the state is prohibited from harming him.73  
The state in these instances has a “special relationship”74 with the individual.  
Following Deshaney, the Supreme Court has found this special relationship 
to exist with prisoners,75 pretrial detainees,76 and involuntarily committed 
persons at mental institutions.77  
The Supreme Court does not recognize a 14th Amendment custodial 
relationship between the state and children in foster care.  However, several 
                                                                                                                            
67. Id. (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195–96).  
68. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202.  
69. See id. at 199–201 (discussing a few instances when state actor liability has 
attached).  
70. See id. at 199–200.   
71. Id. at 199–200. 
72. Rosa, 795 F.3d at 437–38 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189 at 200(1989)). 
73. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. 
74. Id. at 194.  
75. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (ruling that the Eighth Amendment 
establishes that states owe affirmative duties to prisoners).  
76. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (holding that states have an 
affirmative duty to provide to keep pretrial detainees safe). 
77. See Youngeberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (holding that states owe an 
affirmative duty to involuntarily committed individuals in institutions under substantive due 
process). 
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circuits hold that foster children have a substantive due process right to safe 
conditions while in custody, and that state agencies can be held liable if that 
right is violated.78  
B. State Created Danger  
The Deshaney Court carved out a second category of case where a state 
actor could be liable for failing to protect an individual.79  The Court noted 
that Deshaney may have been different if the state had contributed to the 
dangerous conditions the child faced or increased the vulnerability to the 
dangerous conditions:  
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua 
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it 
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.  That the 
State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the 
analysis, for when it returned him to his father’s custody, it placed 
him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had 
it not acted at all; the State does not become the permanent 
guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered him 
shelter.  Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional 
duty to protect Joshua.80 
This dicta lead to “state-created danger” jurisprudence in the circuit 
courts.81  In state-created danger cases, the government is held 
constitutionally liable for actions towards private citizens which created or 
                                                                                                                            
78. See Addendum B to L.J. By and Through Darr v. Massina, 699 F.Supp. 508, 539 
(1988) (holding that a special relationship existed between Baltimore’s foster care children and 
the Baltimore City Department of Social Services and that foster children are entitled to 
reasonably safe placements free from emotional or physical harm.).  But see White by White v. 
Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that negligence was not enough to 
prove a Substantive Due Process Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
daughter’s death did not “result from the DSS defendants’ violation of any “clearly 
established” statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known 
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Con v. Bull, 307 F. App’x 
631, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendants did not exhibit deliberate indifference to 
child’s safety).  
79. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).  
80. Id. at 201. 
81. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO 
L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing state-created danger cases decided by courts throughout the 
country). 
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increased the harm they ultimately suffered.82  There are a number of circuits 
that understand DeShaney in this way, although they interpret the state-
created danger theory differently.  Some circuits have detailed and elaborate 
tests for state created danger.83  These courts consider how much the state 
has contributed to making a citizen more vulnerable to the harm than he or 
she would have otherwise been.84  Other courts have more vague state-
created danger tests with less defined scopes.85  Still others tend to reject or 
show hesitancy towards using a state-created basis altogether.86  
One salient controversy in state-created cases is whether the plaintiff has 
to have been in custody in order for the court to analyze whether the state 
created or increased danger.87  On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit requires 
custody before it will apply a state created danger theory.88  On the other 
hand, in the Seventh Circuit, state actor liability is available in non-custodial 
settings.89  The Seventh Circuit recognizes that if the state actor places an 
individual in danger then it must, “to the extent of ameliorating the 
incremental risk,” protect the individual from harm.90  The Eight Circuit also 
holds that the plaintiff need not be in the actual custody of the state actor for 
                                                                                                                            
82. See id. at 3 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200). 
83. See Matthew D. Barrett, Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable 
and Consistent “State-Created Danger” Analysis for Establishing Constitutional Violations 
Under Section 1983, 37 VAL U. L. REV. 177, 204 (2002) (discussing the differences between 
circuits on the issue of state-created danger and indicating that “[t]he Tenth Circuit’s state-
created danger analysis is the most elaborate of all of the federal circuits that have adopted the 
theory.”  Other Circuits with well-defined tests such as the third circuit in Kneipp v. Tedder, 
95 F.3d 1199, 1208–11 (3rd Cir. 1996).  
84. See Dykema v. Skournal, 261 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Reed v. 
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993)); Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 
1998) (citing Reed, 986 F.2d at 1126); Reed, 986 F.2d at 1126. 
85. See Barrett, supra note 83, at 190 (stating that “[t]he Second, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits [have] [c]ryptic, [s]ingle-[s]entence [t]ests [w]hich [a]re [i]ll-
[d]efined [i]n [s]cope”). 
86. See id. at 205 (“The First and Fourth Circuits have not recognized the state-created 
danger theory as a legitimate legal claim.”).   
87. See Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 3 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 at 200(1989)). 
88. See id. at 3 (citing Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“explaining that if the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the state-created danger theory, then the 
plaintiff would have to show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference, meaning 
that ‘the state actor both knew and disregarded an excessive risk to the victim’s health and 
safety’”); Pinder v. Johnson 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995).  See also Dwares v. City of 
NY, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2nd Cir. 1993) (finding liability where [state officials] in some way 
assisted in creating or increasing the danger to the victim”). 
89. Barrett, supra note 83, at 193 (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F2.d 1211, 1222 
(7th Cir. 1988)). 
90. Id. (quoting Archie, 847 F2.d at 1223).  
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liability under a state-created danger claim, so long as the state affirmatively 
acted.91  The Second Circuit also treats the state-created danger and 
custodial relationship theories as distinct, requiring only one or the other to 
trigger potential liability.92  However, in the Second Circuit a “causal 
relationship”93 must exist connecting the creation or increased likeliness of 
the danger to the state actor’s alleged actions.  The Second Circuit also 
requires that the state actor had notice of the alleged harm at the time it 
occurred.94  
Another controversy in state-created danger jurisprudence is the 
definition of custody itself.  The Eleventh Circuit defines custody broadly to 
include situations other than incarceration or institutionalization.95  In the 
Eleventh Circuit, liability can attach when “state affirmatively acts to 
restrain an individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf, either ‘through 
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal 
liberty.”96  According to the Eleventh Circuit, there is affirmative duty to 
protect individuals from third party harm that “arises from the limitations 
that state places on the individual’s ability to act on his own behalf, not from 
the state’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from expressions of 
intent to help him.”97   
The Fourth Circuit merges the special relationship and state-created 
danger theories and rejects the state-created danger claim as useful by 
itself.98  The Fourth Circuit also requires custody, although it has not 
explicitly limited “custody” to incarceration or institutionalization.99  The 
leading Fourth Circuit case to apply state-created danger is Pinder v. 
Johnson.100  In Pinder, the Court began by finding that DeShaney leaves 
                                                                                                                            
91. See Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990). 
92. Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 3 (citing Pena v. Deprisco, 423 F.3d 98, 109 (2nd 
Cir. 2005). “The Second Circuit stated: ‘We, by contrast, treat special relationships and state 
created dangers as separate and distinct theories of liability.’”). 
93. See Barrett, supra note 83, at 190 (citing Cook v. Groton, No. 97-73070, 1997 WL 
722936, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997). 
94. See, e.g., Robertson v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 00-7170, 2000 WL 1370273, 
at *3 (2d. Cir. Sept. 19, 2000) (The court held that the defendant could not be liable for sexual 
abuse by a disabled student against another student where the school has no notice of a prior 
incident.). 
95. See Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). 
96. Id.  
97. Id. at 570 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 
200 (1989)). 
98. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197–98.  
99. Id. at 199–200.   
100. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995).  
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open-ended how large of a role the state must play in the creation of danger 
or vulnerability before it assumes a corresponding constitutional duty to 
protect.101  The Pinder court held that at some point, such actions do create a 
duty.102  However, only custodial relationships trigger a duty.103  Moreover, 
according to other Fourth Circuit cases, a real duty exists only where there is 
an actual connection between a state-created claim and the custodial 
relationship.104   
Pinder, in conjunction with Deshaney, constructs a narrow scope of 
§ 1983 liability based on a state-created danger theory.105  The state actor 
must create or increase “the risk of private danger, and do so “directly 
through affirmative acts, not merely through inaction or omission.”106  In 
other words, “state actors may not disclaim liability when they themselves 
throw others to the lions,” but that does not “entitle persons who rely on 
promises of aid to some greater degree of protection from lions at large.”107  
Although the Fourth Circuit has a conservative approach to state-created 
danger compared to many other Circuits, it has left open the concept of 
custody to potentially include non-physical situations.108 
IV. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF DOE  
Doe could have been interpreted another way according to the holdings 
of other Circuit Courts, particularly regarding sexual abuse, and the 
development of 14th Amendment case law.  
                                                                                                                            
101. See id. at 1172. 
102. See id. at 1174 (DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200). 
103. See id. 
104. See e.g., Edwards v. Johnston Cty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Piechowicz v. U.S., 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989). 
105. See Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1174; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. 
106. Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 439 (4th Cir. 2015). 
107. Id. (quoting Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995). 
108. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) 
(“The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s 
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from §the limitation which it has 
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.”  Only defining custody as a “limitation” 
“imposed on freedom.”). 
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A. The 14th Amendment 
1. State Created Danger 
As discussed in part II, some circuits have a more liberal interpretation 
of state-created danger.109  An expanded state create danger theory was first 
developed by the Seventh Circuit in White v. Rochford110 and Bowers v. 
DeVito.111  The Seventh Circuit held that the Constitution protects persons 
who, while not in state custody, are nevertheless placed by the state in a 
position of danger and then left defenseless.112  According to the Seventh 
Circuit, when the state, by its actions, throws a person in a “snakepit” 
without the ability to protect himself, the fourteenth amendment's guarantee 
of due process is triggered.113  
Later, in Wood v. Ostrander,114 the Ninth Circuit held that police 
officers could be liable for the rape of the passenger of a car after she was 
left by the police on the side of the road in a high crime area.115  Davis v. 
Brady116 also involved police stopping a drunk driver, but police were 
responsible for injuries resulting to the drunk driver himself when he was 
left by the police with his keys and then collided with another vehicle.117  
The court, like the Ninth Circuit in Wood, held that it was the government 
that put this person in danger and the government should be held liable.118  
Similarly, in Munger v. City of Glasgow119 police were called to a bar when 
there was a dispute and ultimately kicked a man out of the bar and took 
away his keys.120  It was a cold night and he was dressed just in jeans and a 
T-shirt.121  The police would not let him back in the bar or in his car.122  The 
man died of hypothermia.123  The court held that it was the government that 
                                                                                                                            
109. See supra Part II. 
110. See White v. Rockford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
111. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). 
112. See White, 592 F.2d at 382. 
113. Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618. 
114. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). 
115. Id. at 586. 
116. Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998).  
117. Id. at 1027. 
118. Id.  
119. Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep't, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
120. Id. at 1084. 
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Id. at 1085. 
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created the danger and the government was responsible for depriving his life 
without due process.124 
A particularly nuanced approach was also taken in Paine v Johnson.125  
The guardian of the estate of a pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from 
bipolar disorder, brought suit against the city and city police officers, 
alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and 
subsequent release from custody to a high risk situation, given her mental 
condition, in which she was ultimately raped.126  Police officers were denied 
summary judgment because fact issues existed as to whether the officer who 
released detainee from custody violated detainee's substantive due process 
rights under the fourteenth amendment.127  Significantly, the court held that 
many factors or conduct of two or more persons may operate at same time, 
either independently or together, to cause injury or damage; in such case 
each may be proximate cause, as required to establish liability under the 
constitution.128  Moreover, the court held that legal causation is a fact-
specific inquiry and involves consideration of time, geography, range of 
potential victims, and nature of harm that occurred.129 
Also relevant here is Currier v. Doran,130 where the victim was a 
defenseless child.131  In Currier, a social worker transferred custody of a 
child from the mother to the father.132  The father subsequently killed the 
child.133  The mother brought a § 1983 suit to hold the social worker could 
be liable for state-created danger.134  The Tenth Circuit, finding the social 
worker liable, held that the child “would not have been exposed to the 
dangers from their father but for the affirmative acts of the state [social 
worker].”135 
The Second Circuit has taken a totality of circumstances approach 
which allows a plaintiff to use circumstantial proof of causation that a state 
actor increased a danger.136  In Dwares v. City of New York,137 police 
                                                                                                                            
124. Id. at 1088. 
125. See Paine v. Johnson, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1082 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
126. Id. at 1082.  
127. Id. at 1087. 
128. Id. at 1079 (quoting Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 497 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
129. See id. at 1082. 
130. Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001). 
131. Id. at 909. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 910.  
134. See id. at 917. 
135. Id. at 918. 
136. See Laura Oren, Some Thoughts on the State-Created Danger Doctrine: Deshaney 
Is Still Wrong and Castle Rock Is More of the Same, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47, 51 
(2006).  
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officers were liable for assuring skinheads in advance they would not 
intervene if they attacked a political rally.138  The court found this “crossed 
the DeShaney line from passive to affirmative acts.”139  In Pena v. 
DePrisco,140 police officers failed to stop off-duty colleagues from heavy 
drinking and speeding off to return to duty while inebriated.141  The drunk 
officers killed three pedestrians, and the on-duty officers hindered the 
investigation into the incident.142  The court ruled that although failure to 
act, and no more, is not sufficient to create state created danger, the drinking 
of the supervisory personnel with the other officers creates the situation 
where a reasonable juror could find that the defendants “implicitly but 
affirmatively condoned the danger-creating behavior.”143    
This expanded state created danger approach could be applied to Doe.  
Rosa, through the General Counsel,144 made ReVille aware that he knew 
about his sexual misconduct.145  Reville was constructively aware that the 
Citadel did not notify the proper authorities.146  ReVille admitted that he 
continued abusing the Does, defenseless children, after he was confronted 
and realized that nothing was going to happen to him.147  The decision by the 
Citadel not to report affirmatively condoned ReVille’s behavior, 
empowering him to molest the Does again during the summer of 2007.148  
                                                                                                                            
137. Dwares v. City of NY, 985 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1993).   
138. Id. at 96–97. 
139. See Oren, supra note 136, at 50 n.34 (citing Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99).  
140. Pena v. Deprisco, 423 F.3d 98 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
141. See Oren, supra note 136, at 50. 
142. Id. 
143. See id. at 51 (citing Pena, 432 F.3d at 111). 
144. There is factual dispute over whether Rosa directed or knew about the General 
Counsel’s actions, but for purposes of summary judgment, the court assumes facts in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff.  In order for liability to attach for a supervisor in § 1983, the 
supervisor’s “own individual actions” must have violated the Does’ rights.  See Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 
(1978)).  There is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases.  A supervisor is not guilty of 
civil rights violations solely by virtue of his position as supervisor.  There is, however, debate 
in circuit courts over what constitutes individual actions; in the Second Circuit, supervisors can 
still be held liable if they knew their subordinates were committing a civil rights violation and 
they looked the other way or ignored it.  See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir. 1986)).  The Doe Court did 
not reach the issue of respondeat superior since it rejected the Does’ claim based on lack of 
state created danger.  “Nonetheless, because we find the claim fails as a matter of law, we need 
not delve further into the sufficiency of the Does’ proof.” Doe v. Rosa (Rosa), 795 F.3d 429, 
439 n.7 (4th Cir. 2015).  
145. Rosa, 795 F.3d at 432–33. 
146. See id. at 435. 
147. Id. 
148. See id. 
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This executive decision by Rosa was a positive contribution which lead to 
further abuse.149  Under the circuit holdings above, it could be circumstantial 
proof that Rosa’s actions caused the abuse of the Does in the summer of 
2007.  
2. Alternative Theory of Liability in School Cases 
Doe can also be analogized to school sexual abuse cases, where school 
officials have been held liable for sexual abuse of students by employees.150  
Although the special relationship theory has limited applicability in school 
settings,151 an alternative liability theory has developed in some circuits.152  
No special relationship is required for liability to attach under this alternative 
theory.153 
Many circuits have adopted an alternative liability approach, which 
imposes liability on a school district if a student’s deprivation of rights is 
consistent with a school or district’s custom or policy, or if it results from an 
act of those who are ultimately responsible for setting policy in that area of 
school business.154  Stoneking II was the first case to apply this theory.155  
Stoneking was a high school student who was sexually abused for four years 
by the school's band director.156  He forced her to engage in various sexual 
acts in the band room and on band-related trips.157  The band director later 
pled guilty to various sex-related crimes.158  The school’s principal had 
received complaints about the director from numerous students, including 
one alleging that he had attempted to rape another student.159  The 
principal’s response, after refusing to investigate the student charges, was to 
require the student to publicly retract the allegations.160  The principal 
concealed a file of the various complaints and allegations made against the 
                                                                                                                            
149. See id. 
150. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722 (3d Cir. 1989). 
151. Some courts find that schools have custody of children.  Most do not. See Robert G. 
v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., No. 89 CIV. 2978 (RPP), 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 
1990); cf. J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).  In any event, 
since the Doe children were not in any conceivable form of custody, this theory is not explored 
further here.  
152. See, e.g., Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725. 
153. Id. 
154. See id.; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). 
155. See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725. 




160. Id. at 729. 
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director at his home.161  The assistant principal and the superintendent were 
also informed of the complaints against Wright, but neither of them took any 
action to correct the situation.162  Stoneking filed a claim against the school 
district, the principles and the superintendent under § 1983.163 
This case is significant because it was appealed while Deshaney was 
pending.  The first time it was the before the Third Circuit, the Court, held 
that both schools and their officials could be liable under § 1983 based on 
the theory that the students were “functional custody” of the school.164  
However, Stoneking I was decided before DeShaney.165  After DeShaney 
was decided, the Supreme Court remanded Stoneking I to the Third Circuit 
to reconsider the decision in light of DeShaney.166 
On remand, the Third Circuit once again held that the defendants could 
be liable under § 1983.167  However, this time the court based its decision on 
an alternative liability theory because it was afraid that the “uncertainty of 
the law” under DeShaney would delay the relief needed by the plaintiff.168  
The court held that under § 1983 school officials were liable if they 
“established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly 
caused her constitutional harm.”169  The Stoneking II court cited an earlier 
case, City of Canton v. Harris, which held that a municipality could be liable 
under § 1983 where the failure to train (officers) amounts to “deliberate 
indifference” to the rights of persons with whom the police come into 
contact.170  Similarly, according to Stoneking II a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the defendants’ actions, and inactions, communicated to 
Wright the message that his conduct was acceptable.171  A jury could find 
that this implicitly established a custom or policy that the teacher's sexual 
abuse of students would not be punished.172  The court also distinguished the 
facts of Stoneking from DeShaney because the perpetrator in DeShaney was 
                                                                                                                            
161. Id.  
162. Id. at 722.  
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 723 (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneridge I), 856 F.2d 
594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
165. Id.at 721.  
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 731. 
168. Id.at 724. 
169. Id.at 725. 
170. Id. at 725 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).   
171. Id. at 728. 
172. Id. at 724–25.  
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a private citizen, whereas in Stoneking II, the perpetrator was a state 
employee “subject to (the) defendants’ immediate control.”173   
The alternative liability theory was further defined and expanded Doe v. 
Taylor Independent School Dist.174  The Fifth Circuit found that school 
officials have a duty not to callously disregard a student’s constitutional 
rights.175  In applying the theory, the Taylor court held that school officials 
may be “liable for the malfeasance of their subordinates if they know or 
should be aware of the transgressions, yet consciously choose not to put an 
end to them, for such dereliction can only be viewed as implicit condonation 
of the subordinate’s constitutional indiscretion.”176  
Alternative liability theory can be applied to Doe.  Alternative liability 
theory is most useful for cases where school officials ignore a pattern of 
sexual abuse.  The facts of Doe fit this.  The President learned of several 
independent incidents regarding Doe 1, and actively ignored them.177  
Rosa’s behavior included ignoring the graphic details of the summer camp 
director’s disclosure and her prior knowledge of Reville’s past.178  Rosa also 
appeared before the Board of Visitors of the Citadel but gave them the 
impression that the sexual abuse allegations were inconsequential or false179  
The Citadel, under Rosa’s watch, even invited Reville back to campus 
several times after his resignation in 2007 to speak at special events and 
attend the unveiling of a building.180  These collective actions on the part of 
Rosa and the Citadel cold characterized as a policy of ignoring and cover up 
sexual abuse.   
3. Deliberate Indifference and Shock the Conscience 
There is a final catch-all framework deciding for 14th amendment 
liability when other theories do not apply.  The Supreme Court has 
established three levels of fault for state action—negligence, deliberate 
indifference and conduct that shocks the conscience.181  The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                            
173. Id. at 724.  
174. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992).  
175. Id. at 138. 
176. Id. at 145. 
177. Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 432 (4th Cir. 2015). 
178. Id. at 431. 
179. Id. at 435.  According to a third party investigative report commissioned by the 
Citadel, The Board was led to believe the allegations were made by a parent who was angry 
that his son was not admitted to the Citadel. 
180. Id. (Reville came back after his resignation to speak to the Honor Committee and 
incoming freshman as well as coming back to attend the unveiling of the new “Honor Court”). 
181. Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998).  
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stated, “[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is a category beneath the 
threshold of constitutional due process.”182  Deliberate indifference is the 
standard to employ “when actual deliberation [by a state actor] is practical.  
The highest standard to apply is the “shocks the conscience” test.183  It is not 
always clear which standard to apply in 14th amendment cases,184 but sexual 
abuse cases regarding deliberate decisions about children can employ the 
deliberate indifference test.185 
Youngberg v. Romeo was the first Supreme Court case to recognize that 
a state actor may be liable under the 14th amendment for deliberate 
indifference.186  The case raised the substantive due process rights of those 
who have been involuntarily committed to state institutions.187  Although 
recognizing that the decisions of qualified professionals regarding the 
treatment and conditions of confinement should be deemed presumptively 
valid, the Court acknowledged that the liberty interest required the state “to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and 
freedom from undue restraint.”188  Balancing the competing concerns, the 
Court held that substantive due process is violated if professional decisions 
constitute “such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person 
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”189  The 
Supreme Court, in Zinermon v. Burch, reiterated that substantive due process 
“bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”190  
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court specified that 
deliberate indifference implies the opportunity for actual deliberation.191  
The Court determined that the standard could not reasonably apply to police 
officers who face a situation calling for fast action.192  Thus, the Court held 
that injuries resulting from “high-speed chases with no intent to harm 
suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability 
                                                                                                                            
182. Id. (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)). 
183. Id. (quoting Sacramento, 523 U.S at 851–52). 
184. See id. (citing Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849).   
185. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994). 
186. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).  
187. Id. at 309. 
188. Id. at 319.  
189. Id at 323.  
190. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  
191. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).  
192. Id. at 853.  
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.”193  Relying on Lewis, most appellate 
courts applied a deliberate indifference test in non-emergency situations.194  
An illustrative case to distinguish the difference between shock the 
conscience and deliberate indifference is Williams in the 6th Circuit.195  This 
case involved the inappropriate touching of a fourth grade male student, by a 
teacher, who also molested five other classmates.196  The student sued the 
school district on a number of claims, including a § 1983 action which 
survived motion for summary judgment.197  The court held that standard of 
deliberate indifference can be met by a failure to act, or by a response that is 
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.198 
Some circuits have gone further to hold that a state actor’s actions 
regarding a child can violate the Fourteenth Amendment if they go against 
professional judgment.199  The Tenth Circuit has explained that in the 
context of a child’s rights, the “professional judgment” standard requires 
more than mere negligence but less than deliberate indifference.200   
A reasonable jury could conclude that Rosa’s actions demonstrated 
deliberate indifference to the rights of Reville’s victims and potential future 
victms.  Rosa certainly did not use appropriate professional judgment; he 
violated several federal statutes (Title IX and The Clery Act, discussed 
further below), as well as South Carolina’s mandatory reporting laws.201  
Arguably, Rosa also had a lapse in professional judgment by deciding to 
take steps to cover up the Doe report of abuse, which resulted in continued 
abuse. 
Even by the deliberate indifference standard, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Rosa is liable.  He made decisions which involved time and 
deliberation.  Whether characterized as a “policy” or not, no one could argue 
that The Citadel acted in an emergency situation. 
                                                                                                                            
193. Id. at 854.  
194. See, e.g., Williams v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d 360, 364 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
195. Id.  
196. Id at 362. 
197. Id. at 363.  
198. Id. at 369. 
199. See, e.g., Johnson ex rel. Estate of Cano v. Holmes, 455 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir. 
2006) (noting that a failure of professional judgment that results in some inquiry to a child 
violates the child’s constitutional rights) (quoting Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Serv., 
959 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1992)). 
200 Id. at 1144.  
201. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310. (Mandated reporter laws require individuals in 
certain types of employment to report suspected abuse or neglect of a child to Social Services.) 
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B. Other Federal Child Sex Abuse Cases 
Federal jurisprudence, aside from § 1983, regarding child sex abuse and 
schools can also be applied to Doe.  These cases involve claims of negligent 
hiring and supervision.202  They are relevant because Reville was an 
employee of the Citadel, who allegedly committed sexual abuse prior to and 
while employed by the Citadel.203  During Reville’s tenure at the Citadel, the 
school was made aware of various allegations about his past and about his 
inappropriate behavior with children attending the camp.204 
In Jean-Charles v. Perlitz205 the plaintiffs were children who attended a 
residential school for poor children in Haiti where they were sexually abused 
by Perlitz, the Head Master of the school.206  The complaint alleged that 
board members and other officials who were affiliated with the school “each 
had a duty to supervise Perlitz.”207  The defendants argued that because they 
did not actually employ Perlitz, they could not be liable, but the court 
disagreed.208  Further, the defendants contended that they did not have notice 
of Perlitz’s propensity for abusing children.209  However, the court agreed 
with plaintiffs that when one board member saw Perlitz show the children 
pornographic video and “colluded with Perlitz to conceal the abuse” this was 
enough to support a negligent supervision claim.210  In holding the rest of the 
officials liable, the court used a totality of the circumstances approach: 
“Taking the allegations of the complaint as a whole, it is plausible to 
conclude that the defendants had a duty to supervise Father Carrier [board 
member] in connection with his activities relating to PPT.”211  In particular, 
the court pointed to the cover-up of inappropriate behavior when it held that 
the University and various individuals could be imputed knowledge and 
liability.212 
                                                                                                                            
202. See, e.g., Jean-Charles v. Perlitz, 937 F. Supp. 2d 276, 279–80 (D. Conn. 2013). 
203. Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 2015). 
204. Id. at 432.  
205. Jean-Charles, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 279. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 282.  
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 283. 
210. Id.  
211. Id. at 284. 
212. Id. at 288–89 (“The complaint alleges that Father Carrier knew at least one PPT 
student was living at Perlitz’s home, witnessed Perlitz show at least one student a 
pornographic video, and stopped communicating with the PPT administrator who confronted 
Perlitz about sexual abuse.  Viewed in the context of the allegations of the complaint as a 
whole, these allegations concerning Father Carrier’s knowledge of Perlitz’s wrongful activities 
raise a plausible inference that he knew or should have known PPT was violating § 1591.  
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Another relevant federal case is Pettengill, which, in applying state law, 
distinguished claims of negligent supervision from negligent hiring.213  The 
plaintiff alleged that his Boy Scout scoutmaster sexually abused him both 
during the time he was in Boy Scouts and later when the scoutmaster was 
employed at the Haverhill Public Library.214  The scoutmaster actually began 
abusing boy scouts (at least two others) in the mid-1970s, giving them 
alcohol and sleeping with them alone in tents.215  The defendant molested 
the plaintiff hundreds of times.216  Plaintiff sued the City of Havervill under 
negligent supervision and negligent hiring theories.217  The Court held that a 
claim of negligent supervision alone would likely be barred against the City 
because the abuse did not occur while the defendant was acting within the 
scope of his employment, however a claim for negligent hiring was 
sufficient to stand because it was the actions of one or more employees of 
the city of Haverhill that “materially contributed” to the defendant “being in 
charge of teenage boys at the Library and gaining increased autonomy.”218  
The Court reasoned that “if Pettengill can prove that Haverhill negligently 
hired Curtis, it may have “originally caused” the situation and, therefore, it 
would not be immune from suit pursuant to § 10(j).”219 Similarly, if 
negligent promotion of Curtis by Haverhill created a new risk by giving 
Curtis more autonomy, that too would make Haverhill the “original cause” 
of Pettengill’s injuries.220  In addition, these theories of negligence against 
Haverhill made “it irrelevant that Curtis was not acting within the scope of 
his employment when he allegedly abused Pettengill.221  Therefore, 
Haverhill’s motion to dismiss was denied.”222 
Rosa and the General Counsel created a new risk of abuse to the Does 
by confronting Reville but then not reporting him.  As discussed, this 
confrontation had an effect on Reville: he admitted that it caused him to feel 
empowered to further abuse the Does because he never heard anything 
                                                                                                                            
Fairfield argues that Father Carrier’s knowledge cannot be imputed to the University under the 
adverse interest exception . . . However, the allegations of the complaint taken as a whole do 
not compel the conclusion that the exception applies as a matter of law.  Accordingly, these 
claims survive.”). 
213. Pettengill v. Curtis, 584 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Mass. 2008). 
214. Id. at 353–54. 
215. Id. at 354. 
216. Id.  
217. See id. at 366 (characterizing the plaintiff’s causes of action against the City of 
Havervill as negligent supervision and negligent hiring).  
218. Id. at 367. 
219. Id. 
220. Id.  
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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again.223  He realized he was not going to get in any trouble.224  Even though 
Reville was not acting with the scope of employment when he abused the 
Does, he was still under their supervision.225  Rosa and the General Counsel 
were aware of alleged behavior which they had a legal obligation to report 
and which was the same behavior to which the plaintiffs were tragically 
subjected.226 
V. TITLE IX AND THE CLERY ACT 
Even though the Does were not students at the Citadel, the federal 
statutes and case law regarding how schools handle sexual abuse and sexual 
harassment, namely Title IX and the Clery Act, are relevant. Reville was a 
former employee of the Citadel, an educational institution which is subject 
to Title IX in all of its endeavors, including summer camps227.  The 
President of the Citadel, Rosa, was made aware of sexual abuse that Reville 
committed prior to, and while employed by, the institution.228  The sexual 
abuse took place on a school facility.229   
A. Title IX 
Title IX, enacted in 1972, is a federal statute which prohibits 
educational institutions from discriminating against students based on sex.230  
Title IX provides “an offer of funding on a promise by the recipient not to 
discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the 
Government and the recipient of funds.”231  Title IX’s prohibition of 
discrimination includes sexual harassment of a student by a teacher at a 
                                                                                                                            
223. Doe v. Rosa (Rosa), 795 F.3d 429, 435 (4th Cir. 2015). 
224. Id. 
225. See id. (noting how ReVille was no longer working “at the Writing Center” and 
abused “the Does more frequently.”). 
226. Id. at 434. 
227. See id. at 431; 434 (noting how The Citadel has policies that required the college’s 
president to report sexual assault to the college’s Title IX Coordinator). 
228. Id. at 431. 
229. Id. at 432 (“The father told [the Citadel’s General Counsel] that Camper Doe had 
been sexually abused by a counselor known as ‘Skip’ while attending the Citadel Summer 
Camp in 2002. Skip had allegedly shown Camper Doe pornography and masturbated with him 
and showered with the campers.”). 
230. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (The statue specifically instructs that “[n]o person in 
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”). 
231. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998). 
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federally funded institution.232  Although Title IX is silent regarding an 
individual’s right to initiate a private cause of action against an institution or 
program receiving federal funds, the Supreme Court has interpreted a private 
right of action to exist.233  The Supreme Court has also held that a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 action alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools can 
be brought simultaneously as a Title IX claim.234  
1. Case Law 
The leading Supreme Court case which addressed teacher-on-student 
sexual harassment and Title IX is Gebser v. Lago Vista.235  Gebser 
determined the standard of liability for schools under Title IX.  If officials of 
the institution who have authority to address sexual harassment have actual 
notice of harassment, they will be liable if they respond to that notice with 
deliberate indifference.236  “Deliberate indifference” in Title IX is nominally 
the same standard as applied and discussed above for § 1983 cases.237  
Deliberate indifference is generally defined as an intentional failure to act in 
a situation where remedial action is required.238  
There are circuit discrepancies regarding the definition of actual notice 
in sexual harassment and sexual abuses cases in education.239  In Bloomer v. 
Becker College, the plaintiff was a student on the equestrian team who filed 
a formal complaint with the institution that the defendant (her coach) had 
been sexually harassing her.240  Plaintiff was told by the College that 
because of a pending investigation, she would have to return at a later 
                                                                                                                            
232. Id. at 277 (framing the issue before the Court as when a school district will be held 
liable under Title IX for the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher). 
233. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi. et al., 441 U.S. 677, 716–17 (1979).  See also Baynard v. 
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 
503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (Title IX “is enforceable through a judicially implied private right of 
action for damages against a school district.”). 
234. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009). 
235. Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. 
236. Id. at 290. 
237. Id. at 291. 
238. Indifference, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (Deliberate indifference: 
“Conscious disregard of the harm that one's actions could do to the interests or rights of 
another.”). 
239. Compare Bloomer v. Becker Coll., No. 09-11342-FDS, 2010 WL 3221969, at *5 
(D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2010) (regarding that actual notice can be shown by proving the institution 
was aware of complaints by other students regarding the same harassing employee ), with 
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 238 (4th Cir. 2001)(finding that the principal “should have 
been aware of the potential” for abuse, but that there was no evidence the principal was “in 
fact aware that a student was being abused.”). 
240. Bloomer, at *1. 
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date.241  The Court concluded that not only did Becker have actual 
knowledge but they chose not to address the situation.242  The Bloomer 
Court also defined the notice required to allow a plaintiff to “show that an 
institution had ‘actual notice’ by showing that it was aware of complaints by 
other students regarding the same harassing employee.”243  The court further 
stated that “the majority of courts that have considered the scope of the 
“actual knowledge” requirement have concluded that ‘actual knowledge of 
discrimination’ can take the form of knowledge about the alleged harasser's 
conduct towards others which indicates some degree of risk that the harasser 
would subject the plaintiff to similar treatment.”244  The court found that 
Becker acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff by choosing not to 
address the situation adequately in light of the fact that it was aware of 
multiple complaints about the coach.245 
In contrast, in Baynard the Court found that the school did not have 
sufficient notice to create “actual knowledge” of the sexual harassment 
because the plaintiff did not report to someone with the authority to remedy 
the situation.246  The Court found that the student plaintiff, who had been 
molested by her elementary school teacher could not sue the superintendent 
and personal director under Title IX for deliberate indifference because there 
was no “actual knowledge of molestation, or power to take remedial action 
on behalf of board, as required to support recovery against board under Title 
IX.”247  After numerous complaints had been made to the principal, he then 
decided to notify the superintendent who began an immediate investigation 
into the teacher.248  The teacher resigned and Baynard did not report the 
continuing abuse until she was a freshman in college.249  The court found 
that the superintendent conducted a thorough investigation once he became 
aware of the allegations.250 
There are also discrepancies regarding the definition of deliberate 
indifference in Title IX.251  In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,252 the 
                                                                                                                            
241. Id. at *5. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at *4 (citing Brodeur v. Claremont Sch. Dist., 626 F.Supp. 2d 195, 208 (D.N.H. 
2009)). 
244. Id. at *4. 
245. Id. 
246. Baynard, supra note 239, at 238–39. 
247. Id. at 239.  
248. Id. at 233–34.  
249. Id. at 234.  
250. Id. at 236.  
251. Compare Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that 
the plaintiff presented evidence from which the court could find that the failure by school 
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court found the University’s failure to investigate a pattern of derogatory 
comments and threats against the plaintiff that she would be pushed out of 
the program based on her sex could demonstrate deliberate indifference.253  
According to the court “that the record presents sufficient evidence from 
which it could be inferred that the University and individual defendants Drs. 
Blanco, Gonzalez, and Santiago, but not Dr. Maldonado, violated § 1983.  
First, the record could support a finding that the failure by Drs. Blanco and 
Gonzalez to investigate and put a stop to the harassment directed against the 
plaintiff constituted ‘gross negligence amounting to deliberate 
indifference.’”254  
In Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, the court found that the university 
did not act with deliberate indifference when, upon learning of allegations of 
sexual harassment from the victim, it took steps to remove the Professor 
from the University but did not immediately report it to the SUNY grievance 
board.255  The court determined there was no “merit to Hayut’s claim that 
Dean Varbero violated federal law and, therefore, exhibited deliberate 
indifference as a matter of law when he failed to report Hayut’s verbal 
complaint immediately to the SUNY New Paltz Affirmative Action 
Office.”256 
Doe is more like Bloomer and Lipsett than Hayut because the university 
in Hyat actually took positive steps to remove the perpetrator.257  In contrast, 
in Bloomer, Lipset, and Doe, the institutions were on notice of multiple 
complaints and of corroborating evidence, yet they deliberately ignored or 
                                                                                                                            
employees to investigate and take reasonable measures constituted deliberate indifference), 
with Hayut v. State Univ. of NY, 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2nd Cir. 2003) (finding that no 
reasonable jury could find that the responses by the defendants demonstrated deliberate 
indifference, and that there was no evidence to support Title IX liability). 
252. Lipsett, 864 F. 2d 881. 
253. Id. at 914. 
254. Id at 903. 
255. Hayut, 352 F.3d at 753.   
256. Id. at 752.  
257. See Doe v. Rosa (Rosa), 795 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting how the 
plaintiffs complained that The Citadel’s dean ignored school policies that required a report of 
the sexual harassment); Bloomer v. Becker Coll., No. 09-11342-FDS, 2010 WL 3221969, at 
*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2010) (noting how the plaintiff complained to the university’s dean but 
the dean told the plaintiff to come back later, and to a teacher, who told the plaintiff that he did 
not have the authority to help her); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 903 (1st Cir. 
1988) (discussing how there was sufficient evidence that the university failed to investigate 
and stop the harassment).  But see Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 752 (2d Cir. 
2003), 352 F.3d at 752 (discussing how the dean of the university held meetings regarding the 
plaintiff’s complaint, including a counseling session with the perpetrator in which the 
perpetrator was told that disciplinary action would follow). 
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failed to address them adequately.258  Had the Does been able to bring Title 
IX claims (if they had been students or campers),259 they might have been 
able to prove deliberate indifference under Title IX case law.  The Citadel 
failed to report to their Title IX coordinator or investigate alleged sexual 
abuse by an employee, even after telling complainant that they were 
investigating.260 
2. Office for Civil Rights 
Title IX actions can also be pursued administratively by filing a 
complaint through the Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”).261  The OCR uses a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.262  A founded complaint can be 
resolved a “voluntary resolution agreement” that, if followed would “remedy 
the identified violation(s) in compliance with applicable civil rights laws.”263  
In 2015, LaPorte Community School Corporation was the subject of a 
founded complaint which is relevant to Doe.264  The complaint alleged that 
the School subjected a high school student to discrimination on the basis of 
sex by not responding promptly and effectively to sexual harassment of 
School employee that occurred in 2007 and 2008.265  The student asserted 
that, continuing through the time the complaint was filed, the School had not 
provided him with information to indicate that it was taking action in 
response to an internal investigation of the events relating to the sexual 
harassment; that it had not provided him with the results of the investigation; 
                                                                                                                            
258. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 432; Bloomer, 2010 WL 3221969, at *2; Lipsett, 864 F. 2d at 
889–92. 
259. The Does could not file a Title IX claim because they were not enrolled in the 
educational institution; See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (protecting persons, “subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”). 
260. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 434 (“In addition to failing to report the Camper Doe 
allegations or initiate a proper investigation, the Does contend that Rosa actively concealed the 
allegations.”). 
261. See Office for Civil Rights, How the Office for Civil Rights Handles Complaints, 
U.S. DEPT. OF EDU., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaints-how.html (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016) (OCR also enforces Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, and Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act) [hereinafter OCR].  
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See Office for Civil Rights, OCR Complaint No. 05101263, U.S. DEPT. OF EDU.,  
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/laporte-schools-letter.pdf (Apr. 27, 2015) 
(providing how the OCR received a complaint against LaPorte Community School alleging 
discrimination on the basis of sex).  
265. Id. 
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and that the School’s failure to respond to the harassment constituted 
ongoing discrimination.266  This case resulted in a voluntary resolution, 
which included requiring the School to:  
1. issue a statement (following OCR review and approval) to the 
Corporation community of students, parents, administrators and 
staff, that it does not tolerate sexual harassment, encouraging 
any student who believes he or she has been subjected to sexual 
harassment to report the incident(s) to the Corporation, and 
including the appropriate contact information for the designated 
Title IX complaint coordinator;  
2. review and revise its written policies and procedures relating to 
sexual harassment to ensure that they adequately address 
incidents of sexual harassment of any kind, including sexual 
harassment and sexual violence of students by employees, 
provide for the prompt and equitable resolution of complaints 
alleging sexual harassment, and prohibit retaliation against 
persons who report harassment or participate in related 
proceedings and discipline of individuals who engaged in 
retaliation.  The revised policies and procedures are to be 
implemented following OCR review and approval;  
3. examine the Corporation’s code of conduct and disciplinary 
procedures for employees and students to determine whether 
they appropriately and adequately address violations of the 
Corporation’s sexual harassment policies and procedures.267 
Regardless of the outcome of an OCR investigation, a complainant may 
file suit in federal court.268  Founded OCR complaints and federal cases can 
conflict. Ultimately, the OCR can make a finding which does not meet the 
level of liability for a private cause of action in court under Title IX.  In S.D. 
ex rel. Davis v. Houston County School Dist., the Plaintiffs sued the Houston 
County School District based on Title IX, arguing that the administration 
was aware of the alleged sexual assault that was occurring with S.D., a 
middle school female student, and did nothing to correct the situation.269  
                                                                                                                            
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. See OCR, supra note 264 (indicating how the decision from the Office Director is 
the agency’s final decision, but that such decision will inform the complainant whether he or 
she ‘may have the right to file a private suit in federal court whether or not OCR finds a 
violation.’”). 
269. S.D. ex rel. Davis v. Houston Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 5:12-CV-228 MTT, 2013 WL 
4505897, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2013).  
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Before bringing the case, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the OCR.270  
The OCR’s investigation concluded that the defendants did not make either 
an accurate or thorough enough investigation into S.D.’s allegations.271  The 
OCR mandated that the Defendant create a resolution agreement.272  In the 
court case, the Plaintiffs argued that the OCR’s report created an issue of 
fact as to whether or not the school administration acted deliberately, which 
could invoke the deliberate indifference doctrine.273  However, the Court 
held that “although the OCR findings may permit the United States 
Department of Education to impose administrative penalties, there is no 
implied right of action under Title IX permitting private recovery for 
violations of these administrative requirements; thus, any such violations 
cannot support a claim for deliberate indifference.274 
3. Clery Act 
The Federal Clery Act275 is also relevant to Doe because it bolsters the 
claim that the Citadel’s actions demonstrate deliberate indifference.  The 
Clery Act is named after Jeanne Clery, who was raped and brutally 
murdered at Lehigh University;276 after learning that more than thirty violent 
offenses had occurred on campus during the time their daughter attended the 
school, they felt that the death of their daughter could have been avoided had 
those crimes been disclosed.277  The Clery Act requires all colleges and 
universities participating in federal financial aid programs to keep and 
disclose information about crime on and near their respective campuses.278  
Compliance is monitored by the United States Department of Education, 
which can impose civil penalties, up to $35,000 per violation, against 
                                                                                                                            
270. Id. at *3. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at *6. 
274. Id. (citing Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1353 (M.D. Ga. 
2007)).  
275. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) with implementing regulations in the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations at 34 C.F.R. 668.46.   
276. Laura L. Dunn, Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Ensuring 
Compliance with the Clery Act, Title IX and Vawa, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 565 (2014) 
(citing Ken Gross & Andrea Fine, After Their Daughter is Murdered at College, Her Grieving 
Parents Mount a Crusade for Campus Safety, PEOPLE MAG., 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20116872,00.html (Feb. 19, 1990)). 
277. Id. 
278. See, e.g., Layton, infra note 279; Lipka, infra note 279. 
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institutions for each infraction and can suspend institutions from 
participating in federal student financial aid programs.279 
The Clery Act does not allow a private cause of action.280  However, 
each year many educational institutions are found to be in violation of the 
Clery Act because of not reporting, or negligently reporting, sexual abuse by 
employees.281 Penn State University is just one school which is notorious for 
having covered up allegations of sexual assault by an assistant coach.282  
Even prior to the Jerry Sandusky scandal, a report from a team of 
investigators sanctioned by the university revealed that the university had no 
policies in place to meet the Clery Act requirements of mandatory reporting 
of crime.283  Countless other schools have also failed to meet the standards 
set forth in the Clery Act.284  For example, in 2007, Yale faced fines from 
                                                                                                                            
279. See Sara Lipka, Eastern Michigan U. to Pay $350,000 Fine for Clery Act Violation, 
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jun. 6, 2008), http://chronicle.com/article/Eastern-
Michigan-U-to-Pay/41112/ (providing how Eastern Michigan University would pay a 
$350,000 fine for violating the Clery Act); Lyndsey Layton, Virginia Tech pays fine for failure 
to warn campus during 2007 massacre, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/virginia-tech-pays-fine-for-failure-to-warn-
during-massacre/2014/04/16/45fe051a-c5a6-11e3-8b9a-8e0977a24aeb_story.html (providing 
how Virginia Tech paid a $32, 500 fine for violating the Clery Act after failing to warn its 
campus community regarding the 2007 mass shooting).  
280. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(14)(A)–(B). “Nothing in this subsection may construed to—(i) 
create a cause of action against any institution of higher education or any employee of such an 
institution for any civil liability; or (ii) Establish a standard of care. (B) Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, evidence regarding compliance or noncompliance with [the subsection 
of this Act] shall not be admissible as evidence in any proceeding of any court, agency, board, 
or other entity, except with respect to an action to enforce [the subsection of this Act.]” 
281. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 279; Lipka, supra note 279. 
282. Dashiell Bennett, Jerry Sandusky Sentenced to 30 to 60 Years in Prison, THE WIRE 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/sports/ncaafootball/paterno-may-have-
influenced-decision-not-to-report-sandusky-e-mails-indicate.html (former Penn State football 
coach, Jerry Sandusky, was found guilty of 45 counts of child sexual abuse); Jo Becker, E-
mails Suggest Paterno Role in Silence on Sandusky, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/sports/ncaafootball/paterno-may-have-influenced-
decision-not-to-report-sandusky-e-mails-indicate.html (there are allegations that Joe Paterno 
knew of these allegations and influenced the decision to not report the allegations to Child 
Protective Services.)   
283. Jenna Johnson, Federal officials probe Penn State for possible Clery Act violations, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Jul. 17, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/federal-officials-probe-penn-state-for-
possible-clery-act-violations/2012/07/17/gJQA8swirW_story.html/ (indicating that while 
Sandusky was awaiting sentencing, the U.S. Department of Education initiated a investigation, 
inquiring about records made to the public spanning thirteen years).  
284. See Ana Radelet, Report: Schools fail to properly handle sexual violence on 
campus, THE CT MIRROR (Jul. 9, 2014), http://ctmirror.org/2014/07/09/report-schools-fail-to-
properly-handle-sexual-violence-on-campus/ (providing a 2014 report that indicated that more 
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the Department of Education for failing to report forcible sex offenses.285  In 
fact, a 2014 report revealed that colleges and universities routinely fail to 
follow the rules required of them when it comes to reporting sexual violence 
on campuses.286   
The Clery Act supports the argument that it was well established in law 
that school officials must report sexual abuse, thus eliminating a qualified 
immunity claim.287  The Citadel’s officials knew of or should have known of 
this established duty to report.  Arguably, Rosa acted deliberately to ignore it 
when he failed to report alleged sexual abuse which took place on the 
Citadel’s campus (at the camp). 
Moreover, Title IX and The Clery Act both demonstrate that the public 
and the federal government are deeply concerned over the continuing 
problem of sexual harassment and abuse in schools.  The failure of schools 
across the nation to report allegations of criminal conduct288 show that we 
need an array of enforcement and accountability measures.  Sexual abuse 
scandals are not just sensational media stories.  Congress, on behalf of its 
constituents, has been trying for decades to enforce laws that make 
campuses more safe for students and the public.289  A multifaceted approach, 
including administrative regulations and causes of action, is clearly 
necessary. 
                                                                                                                            
than 40 percent of schools surveyed had not conducted a sexual assault investigation in the 
past five years). 
285. Tyler Kingkade, Yale Faces $165,000 Clery Act Fine For Failing to Report Sex 
Offenses on Campus, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013, 6:59PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/15/yale-clery-act_n_3280195.html.  
286. Radelet, supra note 284. 
287. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under § 1983 for 
actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.  
Thus, before liability will attach, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. 
288. See Radelat, supra note 284. 
289. See Dunn, supra note 276, at 567. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
“Sexual abuse in education is the clergy-abuse crisis of this 
decade, if not this century, and you’re going to see more and more 
of it.”290 
This is a quote from the lawyer representing some 40 plaintiffs in the 
most recent sexual abuse scandal, which is centered around a Rhode Island 
prep school.291  The allegations, spanning three decades, echo a scandal at 
the elite private school Horace Mann in New York City, just a few years 
ago,292 and numerous others.293  The most notorious national scandal, the 
Jerry Sandusky case,294 involved dozens of state and federal civil law suits 
on behalf of victims, most of which resulted in settlement.295  The Sandusky 
saga actually closely resembles the facts of Doe, but on a much larger 
scale.296  So it is notable that several Sandusky victims brought § 1983 
claims against Penn State University and its President, the last of which 
                                                                                                                            
290. Katherine Q. Seelye, 40 Alumni Assert Sexual Abuse at a Rhode Island Prep School, 
THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/us/40-alumni-assert-
sexual-abuse-at-a-rhode-island-prep-school.html?mwrsm=Email/. 
291. See id. 
292. See Amos Kamil, Prep-School Predators, The N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/magazine/the-horace-mann-schools-secret-history-of-
sexual-abuse.html.  
293. Richard Winston, Ex-Marlborough School Teacher Admits Sexually Abusing 
Students, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ex-
marlborough-school-teacher-sexually-abuse-sentencing-students-20151021-story.html. 
294. Former assistant football coach for Penn State, Jerry Sandusky, was charged and 
convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse of children.  Sandusky used his charity, the 
Second Mile, to find his victims.  Other officials at Penn State were implicated in having 
knowledge of Sandusky’s actions.  An independent investigation was done and it found that 
school officials and coaches knew of the allegations and did not disclose them.  The report 
stated that these officials showed a "total disregard for the safety and welfare of Sandusky's 
child victims" for 14 years and "empowered" Jerry Sandusky to continue his abuse.”  Report of 
the Special Investigative Counsel Regarding the Actions of  the Pennsylvania State University 
Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed by Gerald A. Sandusky, FREEH SPORKIN & 
SULLIVAN, LLP,  13–15 (July 12, 2012), 
http://www.naccop.org/cdn/pdfs/PennStateReportbyFreeh07-12-12.pdf. [hereinafter Report]. 
295. Colleen Curry, Penn State Settles 25 Suits in Jerry Sandusky Case, ABC NEWS 
(Aug. 26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/penn-state-settles-25-lawsuits-brought-jerry-
sandusky/story?id 
=20069117. 
296. The Sandusky case is similar to Doe in Rosa in that Sandusky was an employee of a 
university, but committed sexual abuse against children off campus.  Also Penn State officials 
knew of and covered up the sexual abuse, according to the Freeh Report.  Report, supra note 
294, at 14. 
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survived all motions to dismiss.297  The federal civil rights action of John 
Doe 6 v. The Pennsylvania State University was settled for an undisclosed, 
but presumably, large amount, in November 2015.298 
The facts of Doe in the Citadel case are idiosyncratic in that the victims 
were not students and they were not enrolled in a school program when they 
were victimized by a school employee.299  The facts inevitably lead to a 
negative conclusion, as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.  But the 
circumstances and problems of causation as a matter of law in Doe should 
not obscure the larger issue.  Sexual abuse by school employees is 
rampant300 and educational institutions must help protect the public and 
make their campuses safe by reporting allegations promptly to the proper 
authorities.  This is not about convicting people, but about making sure 
allegations are handled properly through criminal justice system. 
In Doe, the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity to rethink the twenty-
six year old case of Deshaney.  Deshaney left open a window for 
reinterpretation in sexual abuse school cases.  Other Circuits have taken this 
lead.301  The Fourth Circuit in Doe could have given Deshaney’s dicta more 
teeth.  An alternate interpretation of Deshaney would better protect children 
and young adults who live within the jurisdiction.   
No one can disagree that school policies must adhere to federal law.  
But we must also actively discourage school executives from making 
decisions that protect employees and seek to preserve an institution’s 
reputation at the expense of the public.  Schools must be made accountable 
for disclosure.  One avenue for enforcing disclosure is through federal civil 
rights actions.  The media should not be left with the sole responsibility of 
                                                                                                                            
297. See John Doe 6 v. The Pa. State Univ., 982 F.Supp.2d 437, (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
298. Ben Finley & Susan Snyder, Penn State OKs ‘extraordinary’ amount to settle 
Sandusky sexual abuse claims, THE MORNING CALL (Apr. 9, 2015) 
http://www.mcall.com/news/nationworld/pennsylvania/mc-penn-state-trustees-settle-litigation-
20150409-story.html. 
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informing the public, after the fact, of horrific sex abuse scandals across the 
country. 
